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Regionalisation in the form of the creation of Autonomous Communities (ACs) has 
played a significant role in shaping the Spanish party system since the transition to 
democracy in 1977.  Parties are divided into state-wide parties, operating at both national 
and regional levels, and non state-wide parties.  The latter are most important in the 
historic nations of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia.  Autonomous elections are 
generally second order elections, with lower turnout and with results generally following 
the national pattern.  In certain cases, the presence of non-state wide parties challenges 
this pattern and in Catalonia a distinct political arena exists with its own characteristics.  
Autonomous parliaments and governments have provided new opportunities for both 
state-wide and non-state-wide parties and served as a power base for political figures 




The reconfiguration of Spain as an Estado de las autonomías (state of the autonomies) has 
produced multiple arenas for political competition, strategic opportunities for political 
actors, and possibilities for tactical voting.  We ask how the regional level fits into this 
pattern of multilevel competition; what incentives this provides for the use of party 
resources; how regionalisation has affected the development of political parties; how 
these define their strategies in relation to the different levels of party activity and of 
government; how these are perceived by electors and affect electoral behaviour; and 
whether there are systematic differences in electoral behaviour at state and regional 
levels.   
We employ the concept of second order elections, originally developed in 
reference to European elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985), adapting it to the 
Spanish case.  The basic premise is that electoral behaviour in second order elections is 
shaped by political factors in the first order arena ensuring that first order elections 
receive greater attention and experience higher levels of participation.  The lower 
incentive to participate disproportionately affects supporters of the national governing 
party, while supporters of other parties use the occasion to express their disapproval of 
the national government.  Since the stakes are lower in second order elections, there is 
also more incentive to vote for minor parties that are unlikely to play a significant role in 
national politics.  As a result the governing national party tends to do worse, absolutely 
and relatively, in second order elections, while opposition and minor parties do better.  
On the other hand, this general effect is mediated by local factors, so that we might find 
greater variation between second order elections, especially in a diverse country like 
Spain.  The existence of governments at the territorial level has provided a strong 
incentive for parties to territorialise their own structures, so affecting the party system in 
Spain as a whole.   
 
The Transition to Democracy and the Regional/National Question 
Regional and national cleavages are an enduring feature of Spanish history, but their 
modern significance dates from the late nineteenth century, when a profound crisis 
erupted in the context of industrialisation, the collapse of empire and new social 
conflicts.  Territorial political movements emerged in Catalonia and the Basque 
provinces, rapidly changing their discourse from  regionalism to a nationalism, followed 
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by a rather weaker movement in Galicia.  During the Second Republic there was a 
further diffusion of regionalism, with autonomy-orientated movements springing up in 
Andalucia and elsewhere.  Rigid centralisation and suppression under the Franco regime 
helped to consolidate nationalist feelings in Catalonia and the Basque Country, which had 
enjoyed a measure of self-rule under the Second Republic in the 1930s, and forged an 
alliance between democratic forces and those of territorial defence (Linz 1985; Shabad, 
1987).  
The restoration of autonomous government was therefore a priority during the 
democratic transition.  The 1978 constitution was a compromise between centralist and 
regionalist demands, providing for the establishment of ‘Autonomous Communities’ 
(ACs) where there was demand for them, but making it much easier for those regions 
that had voted for autonomy statutes under the Second Republic (Catalonia, the Basque 
Country and Galicia) to re-create them.  In practice, demands for autonomy spread 
rapidly and by the mid-1980s there were seventeen Autonomous Communities varying in 
size, power and self-consciousness.  Apart from the three historic nationalities, Andalucia 
also proceeded under article 151, giving it advanced status, while Navarre modernised an 
existing foral1 system of autonomy.  The other ACs have proceeded more slowly under 
Article 143 of the constitution (Aja 1999; Vallés 1992).2 
These five cases, together with the Canary Islands, contrast with the ‘ordinary’ 
status regions, producing a constitutional asymmetry.  There is also a political asymmetry.  
Basque nationalism has tended to be separatist (although with a great deal of 
ambivalence) while mainstream Catalan nationalism has sought home rule within a 
reconstituted Spain and a role in Spanish politics.  Galician nationalism has traditionally 
been weaker and divided and has never dominated the autonomous parliament.  
Elsewhere, there are regionalisms of varying strengths, and large parts of the country 
without any significant regionalist sentiment (Shabad, 1987; Vallés 1987; Pallarés 1990; 
Pallarés, Montero y Llera, 1997).  Despite efforts by successive central governments to 
impose a uniform pattern on the Autonomous Communities, there remain some 
differences in powers and large differences in self-identification between the historic 
nationalities and the rest (Aja 1999). 
   Despite the progress in decentralization, several issues are still pending: participation of 
the regions in Europe; relations among autonomous communities; and a reform of the 
Senate to make it a house of territorial representation. The Basque question is still 
conflictual. Since 2000, the governing Partido Popular has made the defence of ‘Spain’ 
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(against the nationalities and to some degree Europe) a principal motif, and has sought to 
delegitimize democratic Basque nationalism by linking all nationalism with terrorism. 
This line has also found some echo within the opposition Socialist Party.  
 
The Spanish Party System: General Evolution 1977-2000 
The history of the Spanish national party system since the transition is one of a long and 
gradual evolution to a balanced two-party system, with a centre-left and centre-right 
option, but with a persistent territorial element, particularly in the Basque Country and in 
Catalonia.  At the regional level the same pattern is apparent, although the territorial 
parties are more strongly established and widespread.  Consolidation took place first on 
the left, with the rise of the Socialist Party (PSOE) (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), a 
historic social democratic party that had existed before Francoism.  The PSOE steadily 
increased its vote until 1982, when it gained an absolute parliamentary majority that it 
held until 1993.  It then governed as a minority until 1996 when it gave way to the Partido 
Popular (PP) (Popular Party), a centre-right party uniting post-Francoists, moderate 
conservatives and some Christian democrats and liberals.  The PSOE’s success was 
helped by the decline of the Communists, who now survive in the form of Izquierda 
Unida (United Left), a group including other leftist elements.  The absence of a 
democratic conservative tradition in Spain made matters more difficult for the right and 
although UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático) (Union of the Democratic Centre), a broad 
coalition of conservatives and centrists, dominated the transition governments , it 
imploded in the early 1980s.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A conservative contender emerged in the form of Alianza Popular, later transformed into 
the Partido Popular (AP/PP) (Popular Party), but suspicions about its Francoist heritage 
prevented it making real progress until the 1990s.  Finally, it came to power as a minority 
in 1996 under the leadership of José María Aznar, who gained an absolute parliamentary 
majority in the elections of 2000.  The political centre was represented for a time by the 
CDS (Centro Democrático y Social) under Aldolfo Suarez, Prime Minister in the transitional 
period, but this too disintegrated in the late 1980s.  This would have left something akin 
to a balanced two-party national system, but for the presence of territorial parties (Vallés 
1991; Pallarés 2001). 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The State of the Autonomies and the Party System 
The State of the Autonomies itself has helped to territorialize the party system.  It has 
fostered regional identities and focused the idea of a regional interest, which has since 
become a prominent factor in national politics.  Autonomous elections have encouraged 
the emergence of local and regional parties, which have then projected themselves into 
national politics.  Autonomous communities have provided new arenas for competition 
and resources for new political leaders, not dependent on party leadership in Madrid.  
This has encouraged a territorial fragmentation of party systems and political 
representation.  On the other hand, parties have also helped integrate Spanish regions 
into national politics.  Many of the territorial parties, including the nationalist ones, play a 
role in Spanish politics, demonstrating the possibility of two level politics, and of 
articulating dual identities as citizens of a stateless nation and of the Spanish state. 
Autonomous Communities have produced a new generation of leaders for the state-wide 
parties and provided power bases for national politicians, again helping to tie in national 
and regional political processes.  The absence of a chamber of territorial representation, 
in spite of repeated proposals to reform the Senate, and of other federal-type institutions, 
means that territorial interests are articulated through intergovernmental mechanisms but 
particularly through the parties.  The main steps in the devolution process have taken 
place as a result either of pacts between the main Spanish parties, or of deals with the 
nationalist parties for support at the centre.  
 
The Non State-Wide Parties (NSWP) 
A considerable number of non state-wide parties (NSWPs) have stood in general, regional, 
local and European elections.  Their principal point of reference is the territorial arena in 
which they carry out their activities and in relation to which they elaborate and project 
their political proposals.  They present their independence from state-wide parties as the 
best guarantee of the defence of the interests of the Autonomous Community, 
generating their electoral appeal around this idea (Pallarés, Montero y Llera 1997). 
Initially it was thought that parties of this type would be limited to Catalonia and 
the Basque Country, as expressions of nationalist ideas, with a weaker development in 
Galicia.  Certainly, cultural, linguistic and ethnic factors, all with profound historical 
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roots, and whose political expression had conflicted with the traditional centralist and 
authoritarian organisation of the Spanish state, constitute the basis for the nationalist 
parties in these Autonomous Communities.  NSWPs, however, have also developed in 
Communities without historic or present-day nationalist conflicts, and in some cases 
have become well-established.  This was observable as early as the first democratic 
general elections (1977 and 1979).  However, it was from 1983 onwards - with the 
proliferation of regional elections and the disappearance of the UCD - that we observe a 
widespread trend towards NSWP consolidation (Pallarés 1990).  
The most prominent nationalist parties exist in Catalonia, the Basque Country 
and Galicia.  Catalan nationalism is divided between the governing coalition, Convergència i 
Unió (CiU), consisting of a liberal (Convergència) and a Christian Democratic (Unió) party, 
and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) (Catalan Republican Left), a left-leaning party 
dating from the Second Republic.  The CiU follows the traditional Catalan strategy of 
pushing for more autonomy while still participating in Spanish national politics, while the 
ERC supports independence, but only in the long-run as part of a Europe of the Peoples.  
Basque nationalism is divided three ways between the historic and centre-right Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) (Basque Nationalist Party), Eusko Alkartasuna, a social 
democratic breakaway party which is nevertheless allied to the PNV, and Batasuna (which 
also competed as Euskal Herritarrok, Herri Batasuna), the political arm of the terrorist 
group ETA banned in 2002.  Galician nationalism has been very fragmented, but during 
the 1990s, was consolidated under the umbrella of the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) 
(Galician Nationalist Bloc), a rather heterogeneous coalition under leftist leadership.  As 
it has abandoned its old extremism and adopted a more moderate regionalist line in Spain 
and Europe, the BNG has made considerable progress in both regional and state-wide 
elections.   
Secondly, there are strong regionalist parties outside the historic nationalities, of 
which the only consistently successful example is Coalición Canaria, a rather 
heterogeneous coalition in the Canary Islands, which has established a dominant position 
through brokerage and clientelist politics, within the various islands of the Canaries.  
Thirdly, there are minor regionalist parties, often conservative and localist, who have 
difficulty crossing the electoral threshold for national elections and so have a strong 
incentive to ally or be absorbed by the larger parties, notably the PP.  Unidad Alavesa is a 
right-wing provincialist and anti-nationalist party in the province of Alava in the Basque 
Country, now largely eclipsed by the PP, which has taken over its voters and many 
 8 
activists.  UPN, a conservative party in Navarre,  also provincialist and anti-Basque 
nationalist, finally merged with the PP.  Partido Aragonés in Aragón enjoyed some success 
in the early 1990s before allying with the PP, although it again presented itself separately 
(and unsuccessfully) in 2000.  There is also a progressive Aragonese party, Chunta 
Aragonesista, which elected one deputy in 2000.  Unió Valenciana in Valencia has usually 
been able to elect a deputy in the multi-member constituency of Valencia province, but 
lately has been in trouble mainly because of competition from the PP.  Andalucia has a 
tradition of regionalist parties, although there have been rather small and in 2000 one 
deputy was elected from the Partido Andalucista (Pallarés, Montero and Llera 1997). 
 
Territorial Politics and The National Parties 
Regionalisation has also affected the tactics, performance and internal configuration of 
the Spanish national parties.  Both the PP and the PSOE are committed to a more or less 
unitary vision of the Spanish state and nation but must accommodate the reality of 
territorial differentiation. PSOE has both centralising and decentralising traditions and in 
the early twentieth century it was committed to a federal Spain, but in government the 
centralist vision has prevailed.  The PSOE competes in Catalonia as a differentiated 
party, enabling the PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya) to give the socialist movement a 
more ‘Catalan complexion’.  In the Basque Country it has governed with the PNV, but 
recently has reinforced an anti-nationalist line, although one sector, notably in the 
province of Guipuzcoa, more sympathetic to nationalist concerns.  The PP has taken a 
harder anti-nationalist line in both Catalonia and even more in the Basque Country. This 
has consolidated a certain anti-nationalist vote in the Basque Country but ability to 
inroads into the PNV vote.  In Catalonia, where moderate nationalism makes a more 
difficult target, the PP’s line has weakened it fatally against CiU. Even the PP has had to 
compromise with Catalan and Basque nationalism, notably in return for support for its 
minority national government in 1996.  Izquierda Unida has also had problems 
incorporating the territorial dimension.  In Catalonia it has been displaced by Iniciativa per 
Catalunya, which includes nationalist-leaning leftists, while in Galicia the local party was 
disowned by the Madrid leadership for allying with the Socialists at the regional elections.   
Decentralisation has also influenced the internal structures of both main parties.  
Regional organisations of parties gained a bigger important role and provided new power 
bases and resources for territorial leaders.  Given the weakness of mass parties in Spain, 
control of institutional resources is critical, providing the financial basis for hiring staff 
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and advisors as well as public goods for distribution to build up client networks.  After 
the PSOE’s loss of office at central level and without the charismatic leadership of Felipe 
Gonzalez, regional barons such as Manuel Chaves in Andalusia and José Bono in Castile-
La Mancha used their local power bases to gain a new influence in the party, including 
over the emergence of a new party leader.  A similar, but weaker trend is visible in the 
PP, where Prime Minister José Maria Aznar came to the party leadership from the 
regional presidency of Castile and Leon, and former leader Manuel Fraga retired to 
assume the presidency of his regional fiefdom in Galicia.  Other central ministers keep an 
eye on their regional power bases, often with a view to returning to seek the regional 
presidency.  Jaime Mayor Oreja was sent from Madrid in 2001 to try and wrestle the 
presidency of the Basque Country from the PNV and, having failed, stayed as leader of 
the local opposition.  Mariano Rajoy, nominated by Aznar as his successor in 2003, was 
previously seen as a potential  successor to Manuel Fraga and retained his personal 
networks in Galicia.  At the same time, regional leaders with institutional power play an 
important role in the internal politics of the PP, including Eduardo Zaplana, president of 
Valencia, who in 2002 was appointed a minister in the national government, or Ruiz 
Gallardón, president of Madrid. 
 
The Institutional setting of Regional Elections 
Elections within the autonomous communities have been a fundamental aspect of the 
territorialisation of the party system, as the basis for regional political activity.  Yet these 
cannot be considered in isolation from first-order national elections.   
 
The Electoral System  
Although the constitution prescribes proportional representation, for the general (state-
wide) elections the electoral law dilutes this by stipulating a system of party lists on the 
basis of provincial constituencies, with a minimum of two deputies per province.  In 
large provinces like Madrid or Barcelona, the D’Hondt formula produces fairly 
proportional outcomes, but elsewhere it favours the big state-wide parties and those with 
a concentrated territorial presence.  So in 2000 it took two and a half times as many votes 
to elect an Izquierda Unida deputy as one from Coalición Canaria.  Although the electoral 
law allows ACs to design their own electoral system within the proportional formula, all 
have adopted a system practically identical to the national one.  At the autonomous level, 
however, it is more proportional since there are more deputies per province (Montero, 
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Llera, Torcal, 1992; Llera, 1998; Pallarés, 1998).  A peculiarity in the Basque Country is 
that the autonomous parliament contains an equal number of deputies from the three 
constituent provinces (or historic territories as they are known) despite huge population 
disparities.   
For local elections, each municipality is a constituency with a similar system of 
proportional representation and a number of seats in each that makes it exceptionally 
proportional (Pallarés and Delgado, 2002).  For European elections, the whole of Spain is 
a single constituency, posing major problems for territorial parties, which have to present 
a whole slate of candidates and hope to gain a large enough proportion of the total vote 
to elect a single member.  While the Basque and Catalan nationalists are able to do this, 
other territorial parties have to form rather artificial alliances.   
 
Timing of Elections 
The four ACs established under Article 151 (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia 
and Andalucia) can set the time of their own elections within the limits of their four-
year terms, while the other thirteen ACs hold their elections on the same day, to 
coincide with national elections.  This has repercussions for turnout, electoral 
behaviour and the configuration of parties.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Turnout and Abstention 
Abstention levels in autonomous elections have averaged 33.7 per cent, above that for 
national elections and close to the level in municipal elections.  This is consistent with the 
second order notion, but turnout is also influenced by national factors at the time of the 
elections as well as factors specific to each AC.  Taking the different types of elections in 
Spain as a whole, abstention has usually been between 30 and 40 per cent but in general 
elections abstention has been lower (20 per cent) where there was a prospect of an 
important political change.  There have been knock-on effects for second order elections 
- autonomous, municipal and European - which have also had higher abstention rates in 
times of national demobilisation (1991), falling in times of tight national competition 
(1995 and 2003) and rising after the political change at national level (1999).3  This is 
further evidence for the second-order interpretation.  We do find, on the other hand, that 
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this general trend is mediated by local factors, so a to produce variation among the 
autonomous communities.    
Looking at differences in turnout among ACs we can distinguish three groups.  
Cantabria, Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and Valencia, followed by La Rioja, Castilla-
Leon and Murcia, have had the highest turnout.  Aragon, Madrid, the Basque Country 
and Asturias are in the median position, along with Navarre, where turnout has fallen 
over time.  The Canaries, Catalonia, Galicia and the Balearic Islands have the lowest 
turnout, albeit with a steady increase in Galicia and a decline in the Balearics.  This 
ranking tends to be the same for both national and autonomous elections (Justel, 1995; 
Pallarés, 1994).   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
There are various explanations for the variation in turnout across ACs.  The 
historic nationalities, which had demanded self-government from the very beginning, 
might have a tendency towards higher levels of participation.  On the other hand, these 
ACs stage their elections independently of the other ACs, while the others combine 
theirs with municipal elections, subsequently garnering greater national publicity and, 
hypothetically, higher levels of mobilisation.  One might also expect that the municipal 
and regional elections would influence each other.  Unfortunately, we are not able to 
control for all these factors and give definitive answers.  Regional elections in the historic 
nations do not show higher levels of turnout overall but at the individual level, however,  
people who identify strongly with the titular nationality of the historic regions are more 
likely to vote.  Holding all the autonomous elections together does not necessarily 
increase turnout, but holding them separately is associated with greater variation in 
turnout (Pallarés, 1994).  Long-term experience, including the era before electoral cycles 
were synchronized, illustrates that holding autonomous and municipal elections at the 
same time increases turnout in the former.  The case of Andalucia shows how national 
(first order) elections can pull up the turnout in second order elections.  Regional and 
municipal elections also served to pull up participation in the simultaneous European 
elections of 1987 and 1999.  Generally, we can say that the holding of simultaneous 
elections has an homogenisation effect raising turnout to the normal levels of whichever is 
the higher order election (Pallarés, 1994).   
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Autonomous Elections: Voting and Institutional Patterns, 1983-2003 
As each of the autonomous communities has held at least six elections to its regional 
parliament we can identify certain trends and patterns.  A first stage, from 1983 to 1991, 
was dominated by the PSOE, which at that time also formed the national government in 
Madrid.  A second phase, starting in 1995, was marked by advances by the PP, following 
a surge in the 1993 general elections that finally led to its gaining power nationally in 
1996.  Autonomous elections clearly followed national trends, albeit with local variations 
and ACs tended to be dominated by one party or the other.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
The national elections of 1982 marked the beginning of the PSOE’s dominance, 
something that was confirmed when it won most AC elections in 1983.  The advance of 
the PP in the 1993 general elections and 1994 European elections ushered in a radical 
change of control of ACs in 1995.   This period was characterised by a demobilisation of 
PSOE electors in response to the poor image of the government and scandals at the 
national level.  PP voters, on the other hand, had an incentive to express their opposition 
to the national government in anticipation of a change at that level.  Finally, the victory 
of the PP in the national elections of 1996 was followed by a consolidation of its position 
in the autonomous elections of 1999 and the national elections of 2000 (Pallarés 1994; 
2000). In 2003, PSOE went ahead again, in a context marked by opposition to Aznar’s 
policy on Iraq and a strong nationalisation of the campaign. 4 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
The theory of second order elections would predict that parties in opposition and minor 
parties would do well in autonomous elections.  In general, the governing party has 
indeed fallen back in these elections, sometimes along with the principal opposition 
party, to the advantage of small and non-state-wide (regionalist and minority nationalist) 
parties.  This, of course, plays differently in different ACs on account of local political 
factors.   
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
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The main finding in Table 6 is the systematic advantage that non-state-wide parties enjoy 
in autonomous elections.  Contrary to the theory of second order elections, national 
opposition parties do not consistently gained in elections to the autonomous parliaments.  
The PSOE lost support between the national election of 1996 and the autonomous 
elections of 1999, although it made up some ground lost at the previous autonomous 
elections of 1995.  The PP has also sometimes done worse in autonomous elections than 
it did in the national arena.  This is due to the presence of remnants of the old CDS at 
the regional level as well as the presence of non-state-wide competitors on the centre-
right.  Nevertheless the PSOE has also been losing voters to the NSWPs in autonomous 
elections.  Catalonia represents a good case, with many voters who support both the PP 
and the PSOE at the national level either opting for the nationalist CiU at the 
autonomous level or abstaining – much as we would expect in second order elections.   
 
INSERT TABLES  7-8 
 
 
The Autonomous Governments 
In the control of autonomous governments, PSOE dominated until 1991 with a swing 
to the PP from 1995.  In general, there has not been ‘divided government’, with 
different parties predominating at each level.  On the contrary, the same party has 
tended to dominate – the main exception being the transitional period from June 1995 
until March 1996, following the PP’s triumph at the autonomous elections and its 
national victory.      
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
There has been no universal tendency for the opposition parties to use the autonomous 
governments as a platform for national opposition.  Rather, they have tended to focus on 
the internal politics of their regions.  The absence of a territorial chamber in the national 
parliament also distances autonomous politics from that in Madrid and discourages 
regional leaders from playing to a national audience.  A more divided situation has 
existed since 1999 and there is now some tendency towards partisan politics in the 
relationship between central and autonomous governments, a tendency reinforced by the 
results of 2003. 
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Around half of all autonomous governments have been formed by single parties 
enjoying absolute majorities (Table 10).  The next most popular formula is minority 
governments, which have tended to be rather stable on account of the divided 
opposition, although in a few cases ad hoc alliances among the opposition parties have 
caused them problems.  Coalition governments have been rarer and, with only two 
transitory exceptions, have involved one state-wide party with a non state-wide one.  
Minority governments have not been unstable principally on account of the lack of 
alternative majorities.  Nor have the occasional government crises in the Autonomous 
Communities had repercussions in national politics.   
 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
 
Intergovernmental conflict in the early 1980s was confined almost entirely to Catalonia 
and the Basque Country as they found themselves on occasion pitted against the central 
government.  After 1993 there was a greater partisan division between the two levels but 
the subsequent conflicts were not always structured on party lines (Aja, 1999).  
Controversies such as that over the transfer of water from the Tajo to the Segura, or the 
financing of autonomous governments, also led to clashes between governments of the 




Electoral Competition and Party Systems 
 
The Structure of the Party Systems 
The party systems in most Autonomous Communities are dominated by the big state-
wide parties, with the exceptions of Catalonia, the Basque Country, the Canaries and, to a 
lesser extent, Galicia.  The party system in each AC is shaped by general factors as well as 
those specific to individual Autonomous Communities, while patterns of party 
domination tend to be the same at both levels.  Through the 1980s there was a general 
pattern of stability, followed by a period of greater volatility and then a re-stabilisation 
around the dominance of the PP, with some recovery by the PSOE and in 1999 and 
2003.  Over the whole period, the PSOE has remained the largest party in Andalucia, 
Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha, while the PP has always won in Galicia and the 
 15 
Balearics and the PNV has been dominant in the Basque Country.  There has been a 
tendency towards bipolar competition as the state-wide third parties have declined – 
principally the CDS at the end of the 1980s and the IU in the late 1990s.  The position of 
non-state-wide parties also stabilised.  Overall, there is a pattern of moderate party 
competition, with most ACs clearly dominated by one party, but opposition forces 
providing at least the prospect of alternation at some point in the future (Pallares 1994; 
2000; Oñate, 2000).  
 
Nationalisation of Electoral Results 
To analyse differences in behaviour between national and autonomous elections, we use 
the ‘dissimilarity index’, a measure identical to the volatility index but used to compare 
successive elections of different types (Caciagli and Spreafico, 1975; Corbetta and Parisi, 
1984, 1985; Johnston, 1980).  This cannot be taken on its own as an indicator of the 
national-regional differences, since the changes may be due to factors operating across 
the whole country between the two elections.  Only in the rare cases where autonomous 
and national elections take place simultaneously would this problem not arise.  So to 
control for this effect we need take into consideration the volatility between elections of 
the same type, both national and autonomous.  As Table 12 shows, for Spain as a whole, 
and at the AC level, the volatility between elections of the same type has tended to be 
rather similar to that between elections of different types (Index of dissimilarity).   
 
INSERT TABLE 12 
 
The exceptions are those Autonomous Communities that we have already identified as 
having distinct characteristics.  Catalonia, Aragon, the Balearics and Navarre show more 
volatility between levels of elections than among elections of either level separately.  Of 
these, only Catalonia shows large differences between national and autonomous 
elections, demonstrating the clearly differentiated electoral dynamics (Pallarés 1994; 
Pallarés y Font, 1994; Pallarés 2000b) while terrorism is a crucial factor in explaining 
dynamics of party competition in the Basque Country (Llera 1994, 1999). 
 
The Non-State-Wide Parties 
Overall, the non-state-wide-parties have gained 12-20 per cent of the vote in Spain, with 
a small decline from 1983 until 1991 and a period of consolidation since then.  This 
figure, however, covers considerable differences across the ACs.  Up until the mid-1990s 
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there was a rise in the nationalist vote in the Basque Country and Catalonia, followed by 
a period of stabilisation and then one of decline.  In Catalonia this has left the Socialists 
consistently in the lead in Spanish national elections, reflecting the significance of the 
dual vote (see below).  In the Basque Country, the nationalists pulled ahead of the non-
nationalists in the 1980s but from 1993 the non-nationalists overtook them again, and 
were considerably stronger in 2000.  In both Catalonia and the Basque Country, this is at 
least partly a result of the rise of the PP, previously considered too close to Francoism, 
which is now gaining a larger share of the conservative electorate which might be 
expected to support it on social and economic policies.  In Galicia, where the PP has 
traditionally done well, the BNG progressed in the 1990s at the expense of the Socialists 
while also absorbing the remains of previous nationalist formations like Coalición Galega.  
By 2000, the BNG had almost caught up with the Socialists, whom they had already 
overtaken in regional elections.  In the Canaries, Coalición Canaria has steadily improved 
its position and started to differentiate its performance at the autonomous elections from 




The study of the attitudinal profiles of the NSWPs (Pallares et al. 1997) shows us 
that in the case of the nationalist parties, their level of electoral support reflects the 
historic deficit of national integration within the framework of the Spanish State.  It also 
underlines the fact that those parties are founded – if not exclusively - on their capacity 
to mobilise those voters who perceive their own national identity, and that of their 
autonomous community, as conflicting with that of the state.  
Deficits of national integration, however, do not explain the electoral support for 
regionalist parties.  Nor do they explain why important sectors of the electorate with some 
kind of Spanish national identity choose moderate regional nationalist parties as 
instruments to represent and channel their political demands, especially in elections to 
the autonomous parliaments.  In both cases we must consider other types of factors 
which, whilst related to the territorial level, are of an instrumental nature and derive from 
the original process of democratic consolidation.  The party system developed within the 
context of a simultaneous process of creating and developing the State of the 
Autonomies and this fundamentally affected it (Pallarés, Montero and Llera, 1997).  
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Within the double and simultaneous process of configuration of the party system 
and the Estado de las Autonomías, the NSWPs have developed as territorially based 
instruments for channelling demands and expressing expectations for which the state-
wide parties are not considered suitable.  In this context, the diversity and function of the 
NSWPs are a characteristic of the Spanish political process and party system, through 
which they contribute - to different degrees and with the notable exception of Batasuna in 
the Basque Country - to political integration in a decentralised State.  They do this 
through their role in national politics, which includes supporting the minority 
governments of the main Spanish parties, while delivering gains for their own territories.  
So another incentive for regionalist voting was the role of the Catalan and Basque 
nationalist parties and the regionalists in the Canaries under the successive PSOE and PP 
minority governments of 1993 and 1996.  These were able to bargain for concessions on 
autonomy and fiscal matters in return for supporting the state government.  For a time it 
appeared that minority governments might be the norm, given the nature of the electoral 
system, putting those regions with their own parties in a key position.  The achievement 
of an absolute majority by the PP in 2000, however, has reduced this incentive and 
increased the incentive to be within the winning coalition.   
 
Dual Voting 
Although the overall differences in outcomes in national and autonomous elections are 
minor for Spain as a whole, there is a notable difference in the performance of non-state-
wide parties, which clearly do better in the latter.  This reflects both differential 
abstention and dual voting.  Differential abstention is an important explanation in 
Catalonia (Font y Contreras, 1998; Riba, 2000; Pallarés, 2000c) and, to a lesser extent, the 
Basque Country (Llera, 1999).  Elsewhere we find a sector of the electorate opting for a 
state-wide party at national elections and for a none-state-wide party in the autonomous 
elections.   
In Catalonia, the main exchange of votes is between the CiU and the PSOE and, 
to a lesser extent, the CiU and the PP (Montero y Font 1991; Riba, 2000; Pallarés, 2000c).  
Since 1983 there has been dual voting in Aragon between the AP/PP and the PAR and, 
to a less extent, the PAR and the PSOE (Montero, Pallarés, Oñate, 1995).  In Navarre 
there was an exchange of votes between the UPN and the AP/PP until the merger of the 
UPN with the PP in 1993.  In the Basque Country there is some transfer of votes 
between the PNV and the PSOE, on the one hand, and the PP and the PNV on the 
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other, despite the polarisation in Basque politics and the apparent rigidity of electoral 
alignments (Llera, 1999, 2001; Pallarés 2002).  The movement of votes in the Canaries 
has been more complicated, due to the distinct party dynamics and insularity of politics 
there.  The high index of dissimilarity in Cantabria is due to the rise and fall of the UPCA 
in the general and autonomous elections in the early 1990s.  A smaller but less stable 
pattern of exchange has stabilised between the PSOE and the PP on the one hand and 
the Partido Regionalista de Cantabria (PRC) on the other.  The same phenomenon can be 
observed in the Balearics between the AP/PP and Unió Mallorquina (UM), in Valencia 
between the AP/PP and Unió Valenciana, and in La Rioja.   
Although dual voting has multiple motivations, it seems to be linked at the 
individual level to instrumental concerns and a vision of state-wide parties based on 
ideological criteria and one of the non-state-wide party based on regional interests 
(Pallarés, Montero, Llera, 1997).  Located towards the centre of the political spectrum, 
these voters are also able to use their votes strategically to play the multilevel game both 
electorally and through the institutions of government.   
At the system level, dual voting serves a double role of integration.  It integrates 
the party system, especially on the centre-right, preventing the extremes of fragmentation 
and antagonism from getting out of control.  It also serves to integrate the two levels of 
government, discouraging confrontations that might scare off dual voters.  The 
instrumental use of dual voting, of course, is dependent on the strategic choices and 
attitudes of the parties and can change in the short term, as is observable in the case of 
Catalonia where the CiU has changed alliances at the national and autonomous levels in 
recent years (Pallarés, 2000b, 2001).   
 
Conclusion 
Autonomous elections are a new experience in Spain, except for the brief existence in the 
Second Republic.  Decentralisation has been marked by fears and uncertainties on the 
part of central actors of fragmentation and of losing control of the political process.  
Autonomous elections have played a key role in this.  They have been a source of 
legitimacy to the autonomous governments.  They have provided an arena for party 
competition and the distribution of political resources within the Autonomous 
Communities; and they have moulded new types of relations among electors, parties and 
institutions in general.   
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The general similarity between electoral behaviour at both levels suggests that 
there are not two separate spheres of party competition.  Electoral choices expressing 
distinct orientations and preferences at different levels are certainly not the rule.  On the 
contrary, there has been a nationalisation of electoral behaviour, with similar factors 
operating at both levels.  It is within this overall pattern that the specific characteristics of 
regional electoral behaviour must be assessed, and these have been most marked in 
Catalonia and the Basque Country and to a lesser extent in the Canaries.   
Autonomous elections can in many ways be seen as second order elections, with 
lower turnout levels and results still have a tendency to reflect national events.  The 
patterns of electoral behaviour point in the same direction, with slightly less votes for the 
state-wide parties and a higher level of support for the non state-wide parties. 
Autonomous elections between two general elections do provide these polls with the 
opportunity of being mid term elections, strongly influenced by the dynamics of electoral 
competition in the first order arena (Bibby, 1983).  Even the greater proportionality in 
the system for autonomous elections fails to change behaviour significantly (Pallarés, 
1994).  Yet, even though autonomous elections reflect electoral competition at the 
national level, they do still possess their own characteristics.  
Autonomous elections have certainly served to shape the distribution of political 
resources at both levels.  The decisive role of the state-wide parties in the development 
of the State of the Autonomies was possible because of their electoral dominance in 
most of the Autonomous Communities.  Equally, the role of the CiU and the PNV in 
national level politics was made possible by their role as governing parties in their 
respective Autonomous Communities.  There is therefore a constant interaction between 
the two levels and, while the state level arena and party system may be dominant, it has 
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Notes 
1 Foral systems are those based on the  historic rights, or fueros, which existed widely across Spain but 
are of particular importance in the Basque provinces and Navarre. Alava (one of the three Basque 
provinces) and Navarre kept many of their historic rights even under Franco, while the other Basque 
provinces lost theirs. 
 
 
2 The intention was that, in the long run, even though ACs could proceed down different paths, they 
could eventually arrive at the same level of autonomy.  In the short and medium term, those 
processing under article 151 possess greater powers.  
3 In 1999, the coincidence that regional and general elections take place on the same day in Andalucia – 
the most populated AC - contributed to a low level of abstention in the regional elections.  
Without Andalucia, the abstention mean in 1999 rises to 35.5 and represents a clear expression 
of the demobilisation effect that existed after the change of government in the national arena .  
4 From table 3 it appears that PP are slightly ahead in the regional elections of 2003. However elections 
were not held in Andalucia, Galicia, the Basque Country or Catalonia then. Our remark about PSOE 
being ahead takes  into account the most recent  autonomous elections in those regions. It is also the 
case that PSOE was ahead in the municipal elections held in all parts of Spain along with the regional 
elections of 2003. 
5 See the annual edition of the Informe Comunidades Autónomas to follow with detail the development 
of the ACs and the State of the Autonomies as a whole.  
